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Abstract
The boom-bust cycles such as the episode of the “Internet bubble” in the late
1990s may be described as the business cycle driven by changes in expectations, which
is called the Pigou cycle by Beaudry and Portier (An exploration into Pigou’s theory
of cycles, Journal of Monetary Economics, 2004). The key feature of the notion of the
Pigou cycle is the comovements in the consumption, the labor, and the investment, in
response to changes in expectations. We show that with the assumption that ﬁrms
are subject to the collateral constraint in ﬁnancing labor input (and investment),
a fairly standard neoclassical model can generate the Pigou cycle. We also show
that the collateral-constraint model with the private information can generate the
“irrational exuberance,” i.e., a boom in which each ﬁrm correctly anticipates that its
own productivity will not rise, while it also believes wrongly that the productivity
of the other ﬁrms will rise dramatically.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The boom and bust of the “Internet bubble” in the late 1990s may have been driven by
changes in expectations on future productivity of the economy; and substantial number of
the boom-bust cycles in asset-prices and investment around the world may be explained
by the same mechanism. In the literature of theoretical business cycle research, there is
a growing number of papers that try to formalize this idea. Beaudry and Portier (2004a,
b), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005), Christiano and Fujiwara (2005), Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2005) and Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2004) among others explore the
idea of the business cycles driven by changes in expectations. These research conﬁrm
that changes in expectations in the standard neoclassical models cannot replicate the
boom-bust cycles in the real world, in which consumption, labor input and investment
all increase in the boom period and all decrease in the bust period. In the standard
models, for example, if consumers increase the consumption in the current period due
to the welfare eﬀect in response to the improved prospect of future productivity, the
investment in the current period decreases, since labor input does not increase so much.
Consumption and investment usually move in the opposite directions in response to
changes in expectations on futuer productivity in the standard models.
In the business cycles in reality, however, three macroeconomic variables, i.e., con-
sumption, labor, and investment, usually move in the same direction. These research,
therefore, try to ﬁnd a way to modify the standard model so that the comovements
in consumption, labor, and investment are driven by changes in expectations on future
technology. We call this comovements of the three macroeconomic variables driven by
expectational changes the Pigou cycle, since, as Beaudry and Portier (2004a) point out,
Pigou (1926) is one of the ﬁrst economists who emphasizes this notion of business cycles.
Recent research show that in order to produce the Pigou cycle, we need to incorporate
nonstandard twists into the standard Real Business Cycle model: Beaudry and Portier
(2004a, b) introduce a certain type of complementarity between production technologies
in a two-sector model; Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005), Christiano and Fujiwara
(2005), and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2005) introduce habit persistence in consumers’ pref-
2erence and the adjustment costs in investment; and Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2004)
show that if the labor market is subject to matching frictions, changes in expectations
induce the comovements in consumption, labor, and investment.
There are two objectives in this paper. The ﬁr s to b j e c t i v ei st op r o p o s ean e ws e to f
twists that generates the Pigou cycle. We do not assume technological complementarity,
habit persistence, adjustment costs for investment, nor matching frictions in the labor
market. We introduce a (tangible or intangible) asset with ﬁxed supply (e.g., land or
new business ideas in the IT industry) and assume that ﬁrms are subject to collateral
constraints in purchasing productive factors: The purchase must be ﬁnanced by borrow-
ing which is limited by the value of the ﬁrms’ asset. We show that with the asset and
the collateral constraints a standard neoclassical growth model can generate the Pigou
cycle.
The second objective of this paper is to show that our collateral-constraint model can
explain the continuation of the “irrational exuberance,” i.e., a boom in which each ﬁrm
correctly anticipates that its own productivity will not rise, while it also believes wrongly
that the productivity of the other ﬁrms will rise dramatically. Our model shows that
overinvestment and overemployment due to wrong expectations on future productivity
cannot be stopped even in the case where each ﬁrm receives correct information on its
own future productivity, if it is the private information. This may be an alternative
to the rational bubble theory for explaining why (seemingly or apparently) irrational
booms can continue for a long time. The heart of our story is that overinvestment
and overemployment may become a signaling device that loosens the ﬁrms’ collateral
constraints during the time of euphoria. Suppose that the optimism prevails and people
believe public expectation that the productivity of all ﬁrms will rise in the future. Our
model shows that the collateral constraints of all ﬁrms are loosened and they increase
their output in this case. Suppose also that each ﬁrm receives the private information
that its own productivity will not rise.1 This information is not known to the agents
that lend money to the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm revises its investment and employment based
1Note that it continues to believe that the other ﬁrms’ productivity will rise in the future.
3on the correct (private) information, the revised decision reveals to the lenders (i.e., the
consumers) that the ﬁrm’s productivity will not rise and makes them tighten the collateral
constraint for the ﬁrm. In this case, the ﬁrm’s decision on investment and employment
becomes eﬃcient, while it incurs the loss due to tightening of its collateral constraint. If
the ﬁrm continues overinvestment and overemployment, the lenders continue to believe
that the ﬁrm’s productivity will rise and the collateral constraint remains loose. In this
case, the ﬁrm’s investment and employment are ineﬃcient, while it enjoys the beneﬁto f
the loose collateral constraint. We show numerically for a range of parameters that the
ﬁrms do better oﬀ in the latter case. Therefore, a ﬁrm that receives correct information
privately hides it by continuing overinvestment and overemployment, and consumers
continue to hold the false expectations that the productivity of all ﬁrms will rise.2
Organization of the paper is the following. In the next section, we describe the basic
structure of the model and show that the basic model without the collateral constraint
cannot generate the Pigou cycle. In Section 3, we show that the model with the collateral
constraint can generate the Pigou cycle in response to changes in expectations. In Section
4, we show that the model with collateral constraint and the private information can
generate the “irrational exuberance” in response to the wrong macroeconomic news and
the correct private information. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Basic model without collateral constraints - No Pigou
cycles
In this section we describe the basic structure of our model and show that the Pigou
cycle does not occur if the collateral constraint is not imposed to the ﬁrms.
The economy is a variant of the discrete time neoclassical growth model, which is
composed of consumers and ﬁrms. The economy is populated with a continuum of
consumers with identical preferences, whose measure is normalized to one. There is also
a continuum of ﬁrms with measure one.
2Each ﬁrm continues to believe that the productivity of all ﬁrms except for itself will rise.
4Modeling strategy for changes in expectations Throughout this paper, we as-
sume for simplicity of the analysis that the model is deterministic, i.e., there is no ag-
gregate nor idiosyncratic risk. In order to analyze the dynamics in response to changes
in the expectations on the future productivity, we formalize the changes as unexpected
events in the sense that they are measure zero events. To be more speciﬁc, we analyze
the following case in this paper: Until date −1, the economy is in the steady state where
all agents believe that the productivity will not change forever; at date 0, an unexpected
change in macroeconomic expectations hits the economy and all agents are suddenly
made to believe that the productivity will rise permanently from date τ onward (τ > 0);
and at date τ, the economy is hit again by an unexpected event that the prospect of
the productivity rise turns out to be wrong and all agents restore the belief that the
productivity remains at the initial value forever. It seems unrealistic to assume that
measure-zero events occur two times during a short period. But this extreme assump-
tion suﬃces for our theoretical interest to judge whether our model can generate the
Pigou cycle in response to exogenous changes in expectations. It is straightforward to
generalize the model such that the expectations evolve following a certain stochastic
process just like in Beaudry and Portier (2004) or Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2005).
2.1 Consumer




where β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1), ct is the consumption at date t,a n dnt is the
labor input sold to ﬁrms for production. At each date t, the consumer is endowed with
1 unit of time, which can be divided into labor and leisure. Thus, 1 − nt is the amount
of leisure that the consumer can enjoy at date t.T h e ﬂow utility U(ct,n t) is concave,
twice-diﬀerentiable, and increasing in both consumption (ct) and leisure (1 − nt). In
order to simplify the analysis, the functional form for U(c,n) is speciﬁed as
U(c,n)=l nc + γ ln(1 − n),
5where γ (> 0) is a positive parameter. We assume that the consumers own all shares of
the ﬁrms and receive dividends as a lump-sum transfer. As we describe in Section 2.2,
ﬁrms make investment decisions and the consumers do not. Therefore, given that the
market rate of wage is wt, the consumer’s income consists of wage wtnt and dividends







ct ≤ wtnt + πt. (2)









where λt is the Lagrange multiplier for (2).
2.2 Firm
There exist (potentially diﬀerent) ﬁrms that compete in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket. The ﬁrms are owned by the consumers. A ﬁrm owns one unit of a (potentially
heterogenous) asset, which may be interpreted as a tangible asset, e.g., real estate or an
intangible asset, e.g., a new business idea in the IT industry. In what follows we call this
asset “land.” We assume for a moment that the ﬁrm cannot sell its own land. (Assuming
the ﬁrm-speciﬁcity in the usage of land, we show in Section 2.3 below that a ﬁrm has no
incentive to sell its land or buy other ﬁrm’s land in the competitive land market.) Since
a ﬁrm can be represented by its land, we use ﬁrm i (i ∈ [0,1]) and land i interchangeably
when there is no possibility of confusion.
The ﬁrms make investment and accumulate capital stock. They have three options
for the usage of its capital stock: ﬁrst, they can produce the consumer goods using a
Cobb-Douglas technology from capital and labor; second, they can produce the consumer
6goods from capital and land; and third, they can rent their capital to other ﬁrms at the
market rate of rent rt.
Therefore, ﬁrm i (i ∈ [0,1]) generates the following real dividend at date t:






it + rtk3t − [kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt] − wtnt, (5)
where At is the productivity of the Cobb-Douglas technology, which is common for all
ﬁrms, kt is the capital stock of ﬁrm i at date t, nt is the labor input of ﬁrm i, Bit is the
productivity of land i, k2t is the capital input into the land, ait is the amount of land
i, k3t is the capital that ﬁrm i rents to other ﬁrms, and δ is the depreciation rate. The
consumers receive the total dividends of all ﬁrms, i.e., πt =
R 1
0 πitdi.
The ﬁrms act in the interest of their owners, i.e., consumers, and maximize the present






Our purpose in this section is to analyze the dynamics in the case where ﬁrms are not
subject to the collateral constraints and to conﬁrm that the model cannot generate the
Pigou cycle without the collateral constraints. In the case without collateral constraints,
the FOCs for ﬁrm i imply the following:
wt =( 1− α)At
µ
























There exists a competitive land market. We assume that land i is a ﬁrm-speciﬁca s s e t
for ﬁrm i in the sense that ﬁrm i can use land i most eﬃciently among all ﬁrms. To be
more speciﬁc, we assume that the productivity of land i becomes Bitθ (0 < θ < 1) if it
is used by other ﬁrms. Thus the market price of land i is determined by









i − rsks], (10)
























Equations (10) and (11) imply that ﬁrm i has no incentive to sell land i in the market.
More precisely, if θ =1 ,t h eﬁrm is indiﬀerent to sell or buy land, and if θ < 1, the
ﬁrm strongly prefers its own land to other ﬁrms’ land. We assume that θ is suﬃciently
smaller than one. This assumption justiﬁes our premise in Section 2.2 that ﬁrms do not
trade their land.
2.4 Symmetric equilibrium
In this section we analyze the dynamics in which Bit is common for all ﬁrms. Hetero-
geneity of Bit becomes relevant in Section 4 where we analyze the case where private
information exists.
In the symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms act identically, it must be the case that
k3t =0 . (12)
The resource constraints of the economy are
ait =1 , (13)
ct + kt+1 = At(kt − k2t)αn1−α
t + Btk
η
2t +( 1− δ)kt. (14)
The FOCs for consumers and ﬁrms and the above equations imply that the dynamics of
{ct,n t,k t,k 2t}∞



























82.5 Dynamics in response to changes in expectations
We assume that At is time-invariant. We analyze the dynamics in response to the
following change in expectations on future values of Bt: The economy is initially in the
steady state where all agents believe that Bt remains a constant B forever; at date 0, a
macroecnomic news hits the economy and all agents suddenly become to believe that the
productivity of land will rise permanently at date τ (τ > 0), i.e., Bt = B + ∆ for t ≥ τ;
and at date τ, the prospect of productivity rise turns out to be false and Bt remains at
B for t ≥ τ, and all agents restore the correct expectation that Bt = B forever.
If the consumption ct,t h el a b o rnt, and the investment kt+1−(1−δ)kt all rise during
the priod between date 0 and date τ, we could say that the Pigou cycle is generated
in our model without the collateral constraints. The numerical simulation below shows
that it is not the case. The reason why it is so may be partly made clear by analysis on
the steady state values of these macroeconomic variables. Therefore, before reporting
the simulation results, we analytically describe the steady state.
Steady state Solving equations (14)—(17) analytically on the premise that ct, nt, kt,
k2t, At,a n dBt are all constant, we obtain the steady state values of the macroeconomic
variables {c,n,k,k2} as follows:


















































It is obvious from these values that
dn
dB








These comparative statics imply that (the prospect of) a permanent rise in B may
decrease the labor, while it would increase the consumption. Therefore, the analysis
of the steady state indicates that the model without the collateral constraint may not
generate the Pigou cycle in response to changes in expectations on future values of Bt.
The numerical simulation shows that it is exactly the case.
Simulation Parameter values are set as follows: A =1 ,B =0 .1, ∆ =0 .01, α =0 .3,
β =0 .98, γ =1 .2, δ =0 .06, η =0 .3, θ =0 .1, and τ = 10. The variables are calculated
by the backward shooting method. Since we assume that the economy is in the steady
state at date 0, the capital stock at date 0 is given as its steady-state value kss.W e
calculate by the backward shooting method on kss the path from the initial steady state
to the new steady state where Bt = B + ∆, assuming that Bt changes at date τ.T h e
economy follows this path from date 0 to date τ − 1, since all agents in the economy
believe that Bt = B for 0 ≤ t<τ and Bt = B + ∆ for t ≥ τ. The capital stock kτ at
date τ is given by this calculation. From date τ onward, the economy converges to the
initial steady state, given the initial capital kτ, since all agents change their expectations
at date τ to that Bt = B for t ≥ τ. We also calculate this path by the backward shooting
on kτ. Simulation result is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Response to expectational change, Benchmark model without the collateral constraint
The initial response of the macroeconomic variables during the period between date
0 and date τ conﬁrms our prediction that the Pigou cycle does not occur. In this
period, the consumption rises, while the labor slightly decreases. Most noticeable is that
the investment sharply declines in response to the improvement of the expectations on
Bt. The investment decline is completely counter to the investment boom in the Pigou
cycle. We also conduct the simulation for the case where η is larger than α.I n i t i a l
responses during date 0 and date τ − 1a r ed i ﬀerent in the case where η =0 .5(> α):
10The consumption sharply declines and the investment rises. These responses are again
diﬀerent from the Pigou cycle, in which the consumption, the labor, and the investment
all rises.
3 The Pigou cycle in the economy with collateral con-
straints
We modify the basic model so that the ﬁrms are subject to the collateral constraint and
show that the modiﬁed model generates the Pigou cycle in response to the changes in
expectations.
3.1 Collateral constraint
We assume that at each date, productions of the consumer good take place before the
ﬁrms pay wages to the workers (i.e., the consumers) in the form of the consumer good.
Thus at each date, the workers must provide their labor before they are paid wages. We
assume that the ﬁrms cannot fully commit to pay wages to the workers. We assume
that the ﬁrms have a chance to abscond from the workers in a time after they produce
the output using labor and before they pay the wages to the workers. But the ﬁrms can
put up their own land as collateral to the workers. If the ﬁrms abscond without paying
wages, they can bring the output with them but they cannot bring their land. The land
would be left behind, and the workers would get the market value of the land. Under this
environment, the workers are willing to provide their labor force only up to the amount,
the market value of which is equal to that of the ﬁrm’s land. Therefore, we can consider
that ﬁrm i is subject to the following collateral constraint:
wtnt ≤ qitai. (24)
In the modiﬁed model in this section, ﬁrm i solves (6) subject to (24). We set θ in
equation (11) suﬃciently small so that we can focus on the case where the collateral










instead of (7), where βtμt is the Lagrange multiplier for (24). The FOCs for the con-
sumers and the ﬁrms, the resource constraints, and the collateral constraint imply that
the dynamics of {ct,n t,k t,k 2t,μt}∞
t=0 in the symmetric equilibrium where (24) is binding,









.W es e ei nt h en u m e r i c a l
simulation below that this model geenrates the Pigou cycle, i.e., the comovements of
consumption, labor, and investment in response to changes in the expectations on future
values of Bt.
3.2 Steady state
Before proceeding to the simulation, we analyze the steady state where At and Bt are
constant, and establish the responses of the steady-state values of the macroeconomic
variables to the changes in B. Solving the system of equations (14), (16), (17), (25),















n + k2, (28)
c =
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12It is easily shown that Bk
η
2 − δk2 > 0a n d d
dB{Bk
η






























1−η . Therefore, diﬀerentiation of (30) with respect






































c <q , equation (33) implies
that dn
dB > 0. Therefore, (32) and Bk
η
2 − δk2 > 0i m p l yt h a t dc
dB > 0. It is also easily
shown from (27) and (28) that dk
dB > 0a n ddk2
dB > 0. Therefore, the values of consumption,
labor, and investment are all larger in the steady state where B is larger. This result
indicates that in our model with the collateral constraint all three variables may rise in
response to a prospect of rise in future value of Bt. The numerical simultion in the next
subsection shows that it is exactly the case.
3.3 Simulation
The parameter values and simulation method are the same as those in Section 2. The
simulation result is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Response to expectational change, Model with the collateral constraint
This ﬁgure shows that the consumption, labor, and investment all jump up on impact
when the expectations on future B improve at date 0; the consumption and labor continue
to rise during the period between date 0 and date τ, while the investment remains at a
high level in that period; and all three variables decline sharply when the expectations
are corrected at date τ. Therefore, the model is quite successful in replicating the Pigou
cycle in response to the emergence of the expectations that Bt will rise and subsequent
disappointment. We also conduct the simulation of the case where η =0 .5a n dc o n ﬁrm
that the Pigou cycle is generated in this case, too.
13Why is the collateral constraint crucial? Two features of the model are crucial in
replicating the Pigou cycle: the collateral constraint and the production technology that
land produces the consumer goods in combination with capital input, not labor input.
When the expectations change at date 0 such that Bt = B + ∆ for t ≥ τ, the land
price rises and the collateral constraint is loosened. Therefore, labor input increases, and
the output from the Cobb-Douglas technology (and the consumption) increases. Since
k2 is larger in the new steady state where Bt = B + ∆, the investment must increase
before date τ to smooth the path of capital accumulation. Therefore, the investment
also increases in response to the expectational change, and the Pigou cycle is generated.
If we assume a diﬀerent production technology, the model may not generate the Pigou
cycle. For example, we can consider a variant of the momdel in which the production




t ,w h e r en2t is the labor input to land. The simu-
lation shows that in this case, the investment decreases in response to the improvement
of the expectations on future Bt. This variant of the model cannot generate the Pigou
cycle.
What if the investment is subject to the collateral constraint? In the simula-
t i o ns h o w ni nF i g u r e2 ,w es e tB =0 .1a n d∆ =0 .01. If we increase the values of B
and ∆, the movement of investment becomes odd: For example, the investment jumps
up at date 0 and then decreases gradually in the case where B =0 .2a n d∆ =0 .05. If
the investment expenditures by ﬁrms are (partially) subject to the collateral constraint,
the investment does not decrease during the period between date 0 and date τ.W ep o s i t
the following collateral constraint:
wtnt + χ{kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt} ≤ qt, (34)
instead of (24), where 0 < χ < 1, and conduct the simulation. We set χ =0 .5, B =
0.2, ∆ =0 .05, and the other parameters at the same values as those in the previous
simulations. The result is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Response to expectational change, The collateral constraint on labor and investment
14In this case where the investment expenditures are partially subject to the collateral
constraint, the consumption, the labor and the investment all continue to increase during
the period between date 0 and date τ. Thus it can be said that the plausible modiﬁcation
enables the model to replicate the Pigou cycle for a wide range of B and ∆.
4 “Irrational exuberance” in the Pigou cycle with private
information
In this section, we modify the model such that each ﬁrm receives private information
on the productivity of its own land. It may be plausible to assume that even during a
boom period a ﬁrm has the correct prospect for its own productivity, while the ﬁrm may
be inﬂuenced by the prevalent euphoria in judging the future productivity of the other
ﬁrms. If these private information were aggregated quickly into the public informtion, the
wrong macroeconomic expectations would be corrected soon and the boom caused by the
wrong expectations would come to an end quickly. In this section, we show that when the
ﬁrms are subject to the collateral constraints, they may have strong adverse incentive to
hide the correct private information from others. Under such an environment, a wrong
optimism on the macroeconomic productivity is not corrected for a long time once it
spreads over the economy, even if each ﬁrm has the correct private information on its
own future productivity; and the boom driven by the wrong macroeconomic expectations
continue for considerable periods.
This story may be an alternative explanation to existing theories of bubbles (e.g.,
rational bubble discussed in, say, Blanchard and Fischer [1989] and risk-shifting in Allen
and Gale [2000] ) for episodes of “irrational exuberance.” The interpretation of the
irrational exuberance in our story is that it is a boom in which each ﬁrm correctly
anticipates that its own productivity will not rise, while it also believes wrongly that the
productivity of the other ﬁrms will rise dramatically.
154.1 Information structure
We assume that there are two kinds of expectations on the future values of Bit: Public
expectation on the macroeconomic productivity, which is shared commonly by all con-
sumers and ﬁrms, and private expectation on the productivity of each land i,w h i c hi s
given only to ﬁrm i. Before specifying the information structure for the expectations, we
make clear that all past and present variables are public information:
Assumption 1 At date t, all consumers and ﬁrms observe {As,B is,c s,n is,k is+1} for
all i and for all s ≤ t,w h e r enit and kit+1−(1−δ)kit is the labor input and the investment
for ﬁrm i at date t.
Since our purpose is to analyze how the equilibrium path of the previous section changes
if private information exists, we assume the following evolutions for the expectations.
Public expectation for future productivity The economy is initially in the steady
state where Bit = B. Thus until date 0, people hold the public expectation that Bit = B
for all i and for all t. At date 0, the macroeconomic news hits the economy unexpectedly,
and the public expectation changes to that Bit = B for all i and for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ − 1, and
Bit = B +∆ for all i and for t ≥ τ. People continue to hold this public expectation until
date τ, unless the private expectations of ﬁrms are not revealed. Another news hits the
economy unexpectedly at date τ and people changes their public expectation again to
that Bit = B for all i and for all t ≥ τ. In sum, a wrong public expectation comes at
date 0, which is then corrected at date τ.
Private expectation for future productivity We assume that although a wrong
news spreads during the period between date 0 and date τ, each ﬁrm always knows
private information on its own land, which is not known to the other agents. Thus, we
can assume that the ﬁrm always has correct prospect on the future productivity of its
own land. Therefore, ﬁrm i has the private expectation that Bit = B for all t.N o t et h a t
what ﬁrm i knows about the future values of Bjt for all j(6= i) is the public expectation
16on Bjt.3
Revelation of private information Assumption 1 and the above assumptions on
public and private expectations imply that discrepancy between private and public in-
formation can exist only in the period between date 0 and date τ. In this period, people
infer the private information of ﬁrm i by observing the labor input nit and the invest-
ment kit+1−(1−δ)kit.W ed e ﬁne the public path as the equilibrium path of the economy
in which Bit changes as follows and all agents correctly anticipate the evolution of Bit:
Bit = B for all i and for 0 ≤ t<τ and Bit = B + ∆ for all i and for all t ≥ τ.
Therefore, through the public path the economy converges from the steady state where
Bit = B to the new steady state where Bit = B + ∆. The public path is determined
by solving the system of equations (14), (16), (17), (25), and (26), on the premise that
Bt = B for 0 <t<τ and Bt = B + ∆ for t ≥ τ. We denote the variables in the public
path by putting overline on them: {ct,nt,kt+1,qt,rt,λt}.I fﬁrm i chooses nit = nt and
kit+1 = kt+1 at date t, ﬁrm i’s private information on the future value of Bit is hidden
from the public, and people continue to believe that Bit = B + ∆ for t ≥ τ.T h e r e f o r e ,
ﬁrm i can pretend that the productivity of its land will rise by mimicing the labor and
the investment, which the other ﬁrms would choose under the belief that Bjt = B + ∆
for ∀j and t ≥ τ. On the other hand, if ﬁrm i chooses nit 6= nt and/or kit+1 6= kt+1 at
date t, consumers and the other ﬁrms infer that the public information that Bit = B+∆
for t ≥ τ is wrong, and they infer the private information of ﬁrm i from the observed
values of nit and kit+1. To simplify the process of information revelation, we assume the
following assumption:
Assumption 2 If ﬁrm i chooses nit 6= nt and/or kit+1 6= kt+1 at date t (0 ≤ t<τ),
consumers and the other ﬁrms infer that Bit = B for t ≥ τ.
3For simplicity of the analysis, we assume that the correct expectation is that Bit = B for all i and
for all t. Alternative and more realistic assumption may be that Bit = B + ∆ for t ≥ τ for some ﬁrms,
and Bit = B for all t for the other ﬁrms. We leave this extension for future work.
17We may be able to generalize the model by loosening this assumption so that the inferred
value of Bit can be diﬀerent from B. Although it may be worthwhile to generalize this
model in this direction, we focus on the simple case with Assumption 2, since it suﬃces for
our purpose to demonstrate the basic mechanism for ﬁrms to hide the private information.
Collateral constraint with private information When lenders (i.e., consumers)
provide credit to ﬁrm i, they lend up to the value of the collateral: qit. In the case where
the discrepancy between private and public information on Bit exists, the collateral value
qit is determined in the market based on the observable variables {At,B it,c t,n it,k it+1}.
Since ﬁrms must borrow money before it actually puts the labor input and makes the in-
vestment, qit is determined based on the following information: It = {As,B is,c s−1,n js−1,k js(f o r∀j ∈
[0,1])}t































where E[·|It] is the expectation conditional to the information set It. Note that deriving
this equation, we assume that ﬁrm i believes that the equilibrium path of the economy
is the public path. This equation and Assumption 2 imply the existence of the following
trade-oﬀ for ﬁrm i in choosing nit and kit+1 for 0 ≤ t<τ.I f ﬁrm i follows the path
{ns,ks+1}t
s=0, the market value of its collateral at the next date remains at qit+1 = qt+1,
since its private information remains unrevealed when it borrows at date t +1 . I fﬁrm
i deviates and chooses nit 6= nt and/or kit+1 6= kt+1 at date t,t h em a r k e tv a l u eo fi t s
collateral at the next date becomes the value qit+1, which is calculated from (35) on the
premise that Bit = B for all t. This is because the deviation from the public path by
ﬁrm i makes the lenders believe that the productivity of land i will not rise.
4.2 Firm’s problem with private information
In this environment, a ﬁrm can choose at date t (0 ≤ t<τ)w h e t h e ro rn o ti tp r e t e n d
that the productivity of its land will rise at date τ.T ob em o r es p e c i ﬁc, we formulate
the ﬁrm’s problem as follows. Firm i chooses date T (0 ≤ T ≤ τ − 1), at which the ﬁrm
18stops pretending.4 The ﬁrm it chooses nit = nt and kit+1 = kt+1 for 0 ≤ t<T;a n dt h a t

















where qit is given by (35) with Bit+1 = B.F i r mi chooses T such that











i −(ˆ kt+1−(1−δ)ˆ kt)−wtˆ nt], (38)
where the variables with hat are the ﬁrm’s choices, given a ﬁxed value of T.
If T, the solution to the above problem, is close to 0, ﬁrms voluntarily reveal their
private information, and the wrong public expectations are corrected quickly. If T equals
or is close to τ −1, ﬁrms hide their private information for a long period, and the boom
caused by the wrong public expectations continues for that period. The simulation below
shows that the latter is the case for the plausible parameter values.
4.3 Equilibrium and simulation
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms act identically and choose the
same value of T. Thus, in the symmetric equilibrium, the private information of all
ﬁr m si sr e v e a l e da tt h es a m et i m e ,i . e . ,d a t eT. Since consumers and each ﬁrm take the
revelation of the other ﬁrms’ private information as an unexpected event, the (wrong)
public information is unexpectedly corrected at date T and people become to believe at
date T that Bit = B for all i and for all t.
4Note that T cannot be τ, since the private information of ﬁrm i is revealed unconditionally at date
τ. Thus there is no beneﬁtf o rt h eﬁrm of pretending at date τ − 1. Therefore, T is at most τ − 1.
19Therefore, the equilibrium becomes as follows: There exists T such that the economy
follows the public path until date T −1a n de a c hﬁrm chooses nit = nt and kit+1 = kt+1
for t ≤ T − 1; and that at date T the economy switches to the path, in which all agents
believe that Bit = B for all i and for all t, and converges to the initial steady state.
Finding T To ﬁnd the value of T,w en e e dt os o l v et h eﬁrm’s problem described in
Section 4.2 on the premise that the economy follows the public path forever. Since
0 ≤ T ≤ τ − 1, we calculate WT for all T ∈ {0,1,···,τ − 1} and ﬁnd the optimal value
of T, which maximizes WT. For a given value of T, the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem:
{kt,k 2t,k 3t,n t,μt} for t ≥ T are determined by the following system of equations, where
μt is the Lagrange multiplier for the collateral constraint. Note that the ﬁrm solves the
problem holding the belief that the economy follows the public path forever, and that,
therefore, these variables are not realized in the equilibrium, since the macroeconomic
expectations unexpectedly change at date T in the symmetric equilibrium.
(λt + μt)wt = λt(1 − α)A
µ
















λt = λt+1 {rt+1 +1− δ}, (42)
wTnT ≤ qTai, and (43)
wtnt ≤ qtai, for t ≥ T + 1. (44)
Solving this system of equations, we get the discounted present value of the (expected)
dividend stream WT.T h eﬁrm chooses the equilibrium value of T by solving (37).
Simulation We conduct the simulation in the case where the parameters are set at the
same values as in Section 2. Since τ = 10, we calculate WT for T =0 ,1,···,9, and ﬁnd
that the value of T that maximizes WT equals 9. Therefore, the equilibrium value of T
equals 9. The equilibrium path is described as follows. During the period from date 0 to
date 8, the economy follows the public path, which is determined by solving the system
20of equations (14), (16), (17), (25), and (26), on the premise that Bt =0 .1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 9
and Bt =0 .11 for t ≥ 10. The correct private expectation is revealed at date 9, and
the economy switches at date 9 to a new path that converges to the initial steady state
where Bt =0 .1. This path is determined by solving the same system of equations (14),
(16), (17), (25), and (26), on the premise that Bt =0 .1 for all t, given the initial capital
stock k9. The equilibrium dynamics are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The Pigou cycle with private information
We also conduct the simulation in the case where the investment expenditure is subject
to the collateral constraint, i.e., (34). We set the same parameter values as those in
Figure 3. The numerical calculation shows that the equilibrium value of T in this case
is also 9 (= τ − 1). The equilibrium dynamics are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. The Pigou cycle with private information, The collateral constraint on labor and investment
The result that ﬁrms choose T = τ−1 is robust for small changes in parameter values.
This result means that in our model ﬁrms choose to hide their private information as
long as possible. Therefore, the boom caused by wrong public expectation cannot be
stopped quickly even if each ﬁrm has the correct private expectation on its own future
productivity.
Private information in the model without collateral constraints Note that
the adverse incentive for ﬁrms to hide the private information disappears in the case
where they are not subject to the collateral constraint. In the model with no collateral
constraint, each ﬁrm decides the labor input and the investment based only on its own
private expectation, since there is no beneﬁt from hiding its private expectation from the
other agents. Therefore, the wrong public expectation has no impact on the equilibrium
path of the economy, as long as the ﬁrms have correct private information on their own
technology. The economy remains in the steady state where Bt = B forever, although
the wrong macroeconomic news hits the economy at date 0. The public expectation is
21corrected instantly at date 0, since all ﬁrms reveal their private information at date 0
through their investment and employment decisions.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The notion of the Pigou cycle, i.e., the business cycle driven by expectations, is attracting
attention of increasing number of researchers as a theoretical tool for explaining the
boom-bust cycles in the real world, such as the emergence and collapse of the “Internet
bubble” in the late 1990s. While the comovements of the consumption, the labor, and the
investment are the key feature of the Pigou cycle, the standard neoclassical models cannot
generate the comovements in response to the changes in expectations. Existing literature
proposes several twists for the standard models to generate the Pigou cycle: For example,
technological complementarity, habit persistence, adjustment costs for investment, and
labor frictions.
This paper has two contributions to the literature. First, we show that ﬁnancial
frictions may be crucial in generating the Pigou cyle. With an assumption that ﬁrms
are subject to the collateral constraint in ﬁnancing labor input or investment, a fairly
standard model can reproduce the Pigou cycle in response to the changes in expectations.
Second, we propose an explanation for the “irrational exuberance,” i.e., a boom in
which each ﬁrm correctly anticipates that its own productivity will not rise, while it
also believes wrongly that the productivity of the other ﬁrms will rise dramatically. We
consider the case where a wrong macroeconomic news spreads over the economy, while
each ﬁrm has the correct private information on its own future technology. If the correct
private information were revealed quickly, the boom driven by the wrong expectation
would be stopped early. We show that the collateral constraint may give ﬁrms an adverse
incentive to hide the private information during the boom, since the revelation of the
private information by a ﬁrm makes the other agents revise their expectations on the
ﬁrm’s future technology, leading to the tightening of the collateral constraint for the ﬁrm
who reveals the private information. If the beneﬁt of the loose collateral constraint is
large for the ﬁrm, it has an adiverse incentive to hide the correct private information as
22long as the boom caused by the wrong news continues. The numerical simulation shows
that it is the case for a plausible range of parameters.
Financial frictions represented by the collateral constraint are widely used in explain-
ing the features of the (relatively large) business ﬂuctuations.5 It may be said that this
paper conﬁrms the usefulness of the collateral constraint as a building block in the theory
of the business cycles by showing that it can explain the key features in the boom-bust
cycles driven by changes in expectations.
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